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USING THE OPEN SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE TO
UNDERSTAND CRITICAL INCIDENTS
Denise D.P. Thompson, Ph.D.
Abstract
At the end of its Fall 2010 conference, the Academy for Critical Incident Analysis (ACIA) called
for the development of frameworks that would aid in the study and analysis of critical incidents.
This paper responds to that call. The paper answers the question, “is it possible to construct a
framework that is generic enough to encapsulate the essential components observed in all critical
incidents?” The paper utilizes the open systems perspective to develop a conceptual framework to
help us delineate and understand critical incidents and how they evolve. The paper presents
examples to substantiate arguments made about the framework. The chief example relied on for
this purpose is Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Open systems is a good candidate to help our
understanding of critical incidents because like critical incidents an open system is one whose
component parts are so interrelated and interdependent that any change in one component
produces simultaneous changes in other components and so alter the thing as a whole. The open
systems perspective helps us to focus on the dynamical nature of critical incidents. In addition,
open systems perspective helps us to consider the fact that there is no simple cause and effect
relationship in critical incidents, but that there are multiple relationships, and simultaneous
consequences throughout the critical incident system. A notable insight gained from utilizing the
proposed framework is that critical incidents are non-linear in that the components within the
system interact everywhere within the system in a non-random and patterned way. Therefore
utilizing a holistic approach to studying critical incidents is essential to understanding these
incidents. The paper ends by proposing a series of steps to guide application of the proposed
framework.

Introduction
This paper addresses the question: is it possible to develop a framework generic enough
to encapsulate the essential components that can be observed in all critical incidents? The author
believes that this question is pertinent to the study of critical incidents today as scholars grapple
with how to advance the field beyond just the study of critical incident cases. Developing
conceptual frameworks that can later be refined, tested and proven or disproved will facilitate
critical incident analysis and ultimately theory development. Conceptual frameworks identify a
set of variables and the relationships that account for a set of phenomena (Ostrom, 1996). A
framework will help us to understand the key elements of critical incidents and the relationships
between and among these elements. This is an important step in theory building. According to
Ostrom (2005), frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive research from which
hypotheses are generated; they ask specific questions and make working assumptions about
important elements and relationships. Frameworks also help us to show important relationships
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and assist the testing of these relationships. The utility of using the systems perspective in
developing this framework is that it moves away from the reductionist, cause-and-effect model to
a more holistic, non-linear study of critical incidents. This is a more meaningful approach to
analyzing critical incidents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the methods used to develop the
arguments for this paper. Section two presents the current definition and model-in-use of critical
incidents and discusses the main ideas presented in them. Section three sketches the open
systems perspective and discusses how it aids our understanding of critical incidents. Section
four outlines the proposed framework, and discusses the key ideas and components of the
framework using examples to elucidate arguments. Section five presents a series of steps that
should be considered in the application of the framework. Section six concludes the paper.
Methods
The author of this paper uses the proceedings of the Summer and Fall 2010 critical
incidents conferences and the critical incident conference of Summer of 2011 to develop a
general framework for critical incidence analysis (Academy for Critical Incident Analysis,
2011a; 2011b’ 2011c). The Summer 2010 conference focused on a case assessment of Hurricane
Katrina as a critical incident, with emphasis on the displaced persons involved. The conference
highlighted the multiple dimensions of critical incidents. The Fall 2010 conference focused on
trying to articulate a coherent model of critical incident analysis and what factors would be
significant. In the Summer of 2011, the conference’s focus was 9/11 as a critical incident with
special emphasis on the experiences of children who experienced 9/11 and as such highlighted
the complexity of critical incidents. In addition, peer-reviewed articles from the first two issues
of the Journal of Critical Incident Analysis provided information for the framework. The table
below gives a sampling of the Journal of Critical Incident Analysis sources referenced and the
information collected to help with crafting the framework.
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Table 1: Select Articles from the Journal for Critical Incident Analysis
Author

Source

Information Used to Develop
Framework

Kirby, E. (Fall 2010).

A Conceptual Model for Critical Incident
Analysis. Journal of Critical Incident
Analysis, 1(1):3-16
Simulation in Interventions Using Agent
Based Modeling. Journal of Critical
Incident Analysis, 1(1):17-29
Critical Incidents, Invisible Populations,
and Public Policy: A Case of the LGBT
Community. Journal of Critical Incident
Analysis, 1(1):30-40
Large-Scale Disasters: Mechanistic
Framework for Prediction, Control and
Mitigation. Journal of Critical Incident
Analysis, 1(2):105-160
Disaster and Recovery: The Public and
Private Sectors in the Aftermath of the 1906
Earthquake in San Francisco. Journal of
Critical Incident Analysis, 1(2):161-173

Definition of critical incident;
Model of critical incident analysis;
Types of critical incidents
Definition of critical incident;
Model of critical incident analysis;
Actors in critical incident
Trigger Mechanisms

Till, R. (Fall 2010)

Colvin, R. (Fall 2010)

Gad-el-Hak, M. (Spring
2011)

Coates, D. (Spring 2011)

Call for consideration of natural and
man-made incidents as dynamical
systems; Scope of critical incidents
Actors

The paper draws heavily on Hurricane Katrina as a critical incident that can be used to
explain the model. With over 1,200 dead, more than 1.5 million people directly affected, and
more than 800,000 displaced, it was the largest forced migration since the Dust Bowl migration
in the 1930s (DHS, 2008). Additionally, there was over $52 billion in government funds to aid
recovery efforts, as well as widespread private sector contributions. Hurricane Katrina resulted in
unprecedented ecological and economic impacts, long term psychological impacts including
PTSD, and changes in state and federal emergency management laws.
Critical Incidents: Definitions and Models in Use
A critical incident is defined as “a relatively brief occurrence involving injury, loss,
conflict, discovery or change of significant proportion, usually unscripted and unanticipated,
with the potential to alter existing societal norms” (Ochberg, et. al., 2007).
The pivotal elements of this definition are “change of significant proportion”, “alter
existing social norms” and “unscripted and unanticipated”. Our understanding of critical
incidents is defined by our experience of and reactions to them (Gill, 2007). A critical incident
causes society or segments of society to stop and take stock – to reflect upon the incident,
critically assess the incident, and engage with issues involved in the incident’s occurrence, as
well as question beliefs, attitudes and behavior (Kirby, 2010). Because there is reflection, largescale change usually accompanies critical incidents. Critical incidents can also present significant
global consequences. For example, the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown that resulted in
global changes in safety standards for nuclear power plants; the 2004 SE Asian earthquake and
tsunami that revolutionized early warning systems applications in coastal communities; and
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted to sweeping changes in how we plan and prepare for natural
4
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disasters as well as fundamental organizational changes to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and better evacuation planning nationally (Bell, 2006).
Critical incidents are unanticipated and unexpected and often so improbable that we
cannot even imagine them until they occur. The examples cited above bear testament to our
inability to anticipate critical incidents. As a result, it is very difficult to plan for critical
incidents. What can be done is to learn from them retrospectively and to put plans and
mechanisms in place to mitigate the circumstances that originally led to negative critical
incidents, or to facilitate those circumstances that led to positive incidents in the first place.
Although critical incidents are usually negative and traumatic in cause and consequences,
they may also lead to positive and uplifting outcomes (Schwester, Dank, & Horning, 2008). In a
positive manner, a critical incident would be a serendipitous discovery of a new program that
revolutionizes organizational processes. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s constitutes a
critical incident that resulted in a positive societal outcome especially for disadvantaged
segments of the society. In addition, the creation of the World Wide Web is a positive critical
incident in that it has completely reshaped the way we live and work, interact with each other,
mobilize around issues, and has generally expanded the reach of information and knowledge in
ways that could not have been imagined prior to its existence.
Critical incidents are not the same as natural disasters, although they can result from one
(Kirby, 2010). The difference lies in the fact that critical incidents tend to follow a more
nonlinear pattern of development in that it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the disaster’s
beginning or end (Gill, 2007). Gill (2007) points out that: these events cascade and result in new
incidents and impacts before they are finally resolved; and that there is a constant stream of new
information that leads to renewed perceptions of threat. Critical incidents evolve exponentially,
rather than geometrically. Their impacts quickly reverberate nationally or globally. They are not
contained at the local level. These points are significant to the study of critical incidents because
they highlight the fact that there is not a definite outcome, but multiple possible outcomes of one
critical incident throughout its life. This is so because the incidents take unusual turns from the
time of initiation (trigger) to stabilization and outcome. We take some time to process the
evolving streams of information, understand what that information means, and then try to put
them to use to assist with stabilizing the critical incident.
Further, because of their scale and unscripted nature, critical incidents are often
associated with high levels of psychological anxiety and stress. Critical incidents often result in
significant long term displacement and distress, even for people who do not live in close
proximity to the event (Freudenburg, 1997). This was true in the case of Three Mile Island in
1979, and again in the 2004 SE Asian tsunami.
Conceptual Model
Kirby (2010) introduced a conceptual model designed for critical incident analysis based
on the 2004 work of Ochberg, et al. This model, shown in figure 1, incorporates the event itself,
the demands the event makes on political actors, the influences of policy on the actions taken by
the bureaucracy and adhocracy, and the resulting tactics that are fed back into the incident
(Goodman, 2008). As shown in figure 1, the political arena consists of interactions between the
governors and the governed based on trust (Till, 2010). The bureaucracy and adhocracy consists
of management and whatever responsibility they delegate to those who intervene to stabilize a
critical incident (Till, 2010). Within the model, the media is shown to influence all other
5
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elements described. The media presents a lens through which the critical incident experience is
filtered and common understanding formed. The media therefore is a key player in critical
incident analysis.

Figure 1: A Model for Critical Incident Analysis by Ochberg, Cinti, Goodman, Houk,
Kirby, Lammers, Melia, Prior, & Taggart (2004).
From this initial model of critical incident analysis one can observe components that
depict the various interactions that take place during a critical incident. For instance, during an
incident government intervene both with the citizenry and with the managers and the managers
interact with the interveners to bring the incident under control. The model in figure 1 presents
two distinct groups of interactions that take place during a critical incident. Interactions that take
place as the critical incident is initiated (interactions between violators and target in the red starshaped block), and those that occur during response to the critical incident (i.e., those between
the governors and the governed, governors and the managers, those between managers –
interactions between the blue box and the green triangle). There are also interactions between all
three color groups and the media that mediate all these domains during a critical incident. This
model still leaves a pertinent question unanswered, how do we know how to identify and label an
incident as a “critical incident?”
This author proposes that incidents labeled “critical incidents” can be understood using
the open systems perspective. This perspective originated in biological science but has been
widely applied in other areas of study in the social sciences including organization theory, chaos
and complexity, political economy, computer applications, among others.

6

Thompson – Open Systems Perspective

Journal of Critical Incident Analysis, Fall 2011

Open Systems Perspective and Its Utility for Critical Incident Analysis
To understand open systems, one must first understand what constitutes a system. A
system is anything whose component parts are so interrelated and interdependent that any change
in one, produces simultaneous changes in other components, and as such alters the thing as a
whole (Tompkins, 2005). Examples of systems include the solar system, a thermostat, global
economy, the human body, a rainforest, a city, etc. Each of these systems has component parts
and processes that constitute its structure. Systems involve input and output of materials or
energy that determine how they function. The various parts have functional and structural
relationships between them that are nonlinear (Walonick, 1993). Although each component part
can be analyzed independently, the utility of the systems perspective is that it helps us to
understand whatever is being studied holistically to give a more accurate picture of how the
component parts work together as a whole. The fundamental difference between a closed system
and one that is open is that open systems exchange matter, energy and information with the
external environment, closed systems do not.
The open systems perspective focuses on the “external environment and exchanges
between the system and the environment so that systems can adapt and renew themselves and
continue to grow or take on different states” (Tompkins, 2005, p. #). Environmental forces shape
the structure and behavior of the (critical incident) system (Tompkins, 2005). A key
consideration in the open systems perspective is the maintenance of equilibrium with the external
environment. If the environment is turbulent, as in the case of critical incidents, then the system
adapts to deal with rapid change. A calmer environment does not require this type of adaptation.
Whereas closed systems’ components deteriorate and are completely spent over time, open
systems renew and reinvigorate themselves through access to resources from the external
environment (i.e., negative entropy) and gets more complex and heterogeneous over time
(Tompkins, 2005). Hence, the longer a critical incident continues, the more difficult it is to be
contained or understood. As the incident evolves there are shifting coalitions of external
participants contending to keep the critical incident under control through trial and error in most
cases or to keep the momentum going in the case of positive incidents. It is these interactions that
determine the outcome of a critical incident.
Bertalanffy (1968) observed that due to the importation of new resources into the open
system, the path or outcome of that system is not determined by its initial condition, but by types
of interactions that take place between components, and also between components and the
environment. As a result, an open system’s end state can be reached by any of multiple means
(Bertalanffy, 1968). This principle is known as equifinality. Components within the system
interact in a non-random and patterned way resulting in not one, but many paths to system
outcome (Tompkins, 2005). The patterns of interaction in turn, give each system its unique
identity which can then be studied.
An important principle of systems functioning is their reliance on continuous feedback
with their environment (borrowed from the field of cybernetics as articulated by Norbert and
Wiener, 1940s). In systems there is continuous throughput transformation of input (information,
material, resources) into output or outcome through a feedback loop (Tompkins, 2005).
Feedback controls or regulates the system. In the case of critical incidents information, policy
action, behavioral change, response and other interventions constitute feedback. Systems
experience both positive and negative feedback. Positive feedback will accelerate any change in
a system and results in amplification of that change, rather than equilibrium. For example, if a
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boulder is rolling downhill, positive feedback speeds up the downhill roll. In contrast, negative
feedback reverses the change within the system and moves it to equilibrium. In the case of the
boulder, the rolling would slow with negative feedback. As a result of feedback, these systems
are viewed by open systems theorists as self–regulating, adjusting to the requirements of the
external environment to achieve equilibrium.
Feedback allows for emergence (outcome) which results when independent parts of the
system interact because they can no longer act independently, and begin to influence each other
(Skytner, 2007). It is this relationship that gives the system its properties and behavior (Skytner,
2007). Because it is not easy to fathom the nuanced relationships that occur within a system,
Beer (1979) encourages experimentation with a variety of interventions as well as attempts at
discerning patterns of change, and the effects of those changes within an open system. This
encouragement is especially applicable for critical incidents that are turbulent in nature.
The benefits of using the open systems perspective to understand and label critical
incidents is that open systems allow for an alternative avenue to understand these phenomena
outside of a simple cause and effect relationship, but rather to understand them in terms of
simultaneous interactions. Using open systems thinking to develop a framework for critical
incident analysis allows for the consideration of the dynamic nature of critical incidents.
Critical incidents operate in an input-process-output (or outcome relationship). Among
the input components are the trigger that sets off a critical incident and the activating event that
pushes the incident into critical mode. Process components are those activities that generally take
place during the response to a critical incident. Herein lays the complexity of a critical incident.
There are multiple responders from the community, including individuals responding to
cascading series of causes and effects (some anticipated; many novel). There are also national
and even international responders as the incident almost immediately overwhelms the local
resources to cope with the incident. Each response relies on some other response. Each event
responded to can potentially trigger other events, some of which are unanticipated (i.e., nonlinear). Outcome components are demands from the governed class or citizens on the governors
who employ tactics and policies to address the initial trigger, and the results of unfolding.
Outcomes also involve measures instituted by communities as they understand more about what
happened and try to improve. They also include changes by individuals, who having learned
from the critical incident wonder what changes they can make, and later reflect these changes
into individual actions. For instance, there are many individuals from the Lower 9th Ward in New
Orleans who now volunteer to monitor the levee system (personal communication, June 12,
2010). Identifying the various components of a critical incident facilitates analysis. In order to be
able to properly analyze a phenomenon, one first has to put a boundary around it. Utilizing the
open systems perspective facilitates this boundary building.
In addition, ongoing case studies done through the Academy for Critical Incident
Analysis (e.g., Virginia Tech shootings, Hurricane Katrina, 9/11 terrorist attacks) show other
commonalities in all critical incidents. For instance, in our study of Hurricane Katrina several
things were observed. First, there are always triggers to critical incidents -something causes or
initiates a series of incidents leading to a critical incident – psychological issues with the shooter
in the case of Virginia Tech; sheer volume of water from the hurricane putting pressure on the
levee system in New Orleans, lack of preparation on the part of city and state leaders in the case
of Hurricane Katrina; failure to take credible threats seriously in the case of 9/11, and a lack of
understanding of terrorism threat prior to 9/11.
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Second, if not properly managed, critical incidents escalate before they are stabilized.
Improvisation, policy implementation and feedback are required by a network of interveners
including government and citizens, but also the media, and non-government and private sector
and individual actors to stabilize critical incidents. Third, critical incidents usually lead to policy
changes. In the case of those critical incidents with negative outcomes there is greater regulation
of behavior that are intended to detect and deter the actions that lead to the critical incident in the
first place. In the case of critical incidents with positive outcomes, there are regulations to
facilitate actions that resulted in that critical incident. Critical incidents usually lead to behavioral
changes because of lessons learned.
The framework proposed in this paper highlights not only the input and process
components, but also outcome components thereby presenting a more holistic way of studying
and understanding critical incidents. The framework integrates a feedback loop to show the
dynamic nature of critical incidents; they interact and exchange energy, information and
resources with the environment, thus allowing critical incidents to be characterized as open
systems.
Using the Open Systems Model to Develop a Framework for Critical Incident Analysis
What would a framework that is generic enough to encapsulate the essential components
observed in all critical incidents look like? Figure 2 presents a critical incident as an open
system that includes several interrelated components linked together in an input-process-outcome
relationship informed and regulated by continuous feedback. The thick broken line around the
components delineates the “critical incident.” The activating event, responses and interventions,
lessons and fundamental change leading to transformational changes in policy outcomes,
community outcomes, and societal outcomes constitute the critical incident. Critical incidents do
not lead to incremental change which results in that being outside the critical incident box.

9

Journal of Critical Incident Analysis, Fall 2011

Thompson – Open Systems Perspective

Existing
Policies, laws,
technology
etc.

TRIGGER

Activating
Event

Response

Incremental
Change

Lessons

Fundamental
Change

Policy
Interventions

New Policies,
Laws,
Regulations,
Technology,
social norms
etc.

Community
Rationalizing
Social Behavior
Change

Critical incident
Figure 2: Framework for Critical Incident Analysis
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Table 2 shows that the components involved in a typical critical incident can be grouped
together into four distinct sets of components – (1) input components, (2) process components,
(3) outcome components and (4) a feedback component. Also in the table in italics are the
components depicted in the proposed framework in figure 2 as follows:
Table 2: Components Involved in a Typical Critical Incident
(1) Input
components
Trigger
- Natural
- Technological
- Social (Human)
Activating Event

(2) Process Components
Responses or Interventions
- Multiple causes and effects
- Novel, intense, and
changing circumstances
- Governance systems
-Actions, interactions
Community Rationalizing
Learning

(3) Outcome
Components
Fundamental
Change:
- Behavior
- Policy
- Institutional
- Individual

(4) Feedback
Lessons
Learned

Key Elements of the Framework
Input Components
Input components are changes to the system that modify process components. Inputs are
detectable changes in the critical incident environment that influence other activities in that
environment. These components are described below:
Trigger
A trigger is the originating cause of an event or set of circumstances that result in a
critical incident (Freudenburg, 1997). This could be a result of natural, technological, or human
actions. Whether outcomes are negative or positive, triggers constitute the underlying
instabilities that lead to a critical incident. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the trigger was the
sheer volume of water dumped by the hurricane. The water quickly inundated the levee system
and led to its breach in several places.
Activating Event
An activating event is the tipping point (Gladwell, 2000) in a set of instabilities in the
environment. An activating event is that point at which the trigger reaches critical mass, the
boiling point in a set of instabilities in the environment, the point at which a trigger cascades into
a rapidly changing set of circumstances that compels the actors to pay close attention to the
rapidly changing and increasing scale of a situation. The levee breach during Hurricane Katrina
was the activating event. The breach resulted in the flooding of the city of New Orleans, water
contamination and the ultimate demise of over 1,200 people and property damage in the billions
of dollars. This case is discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow.
Process Components
Process components are the set of actions that convert inputs into outcomes. Process
components are transformative components. While process components are present in all critical
11
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incidents, the interventions taken, actions and events that trigger new effects, policies brought to
bear, actors, the way the community and individuals understand and react, and lessons are
different in human, technological and natural incidents. The responses to critical incidents
usually include novel approaches because the circumstances themselves are atypical or
improbable.
Responses or Interventions
Interventions are actions taken to correct or ameliorate the impact/results of the activating
event and its consequences. This action is taken by government (federal, state, local), NGOs,
private sector agencies, communities and individuals. Because of the scale and the novelty of
critical incidents, there are often international actors as well contributing technical expertise and
unique resources and skills to the cause. Hurricane Katrina showed this argument to be true.
Hurricane Katrina’s costs outpaced those typically associated with a hurricane (Waugh &
Tierney, 2009) – countries from Afghanistan to Yemen offered assistance of one kind or another.
The Netherlands for instance sent dyke inspection teams, Germany sent water treatment
specialists, China sent medical experts, the United Nations deployed experts from the High
Commission for Refugees as well as those from the World Health Organization (CNN, 2005). In
addition, whereas in normal disasters residents are evacuated within their home states, Hurricane
Katrina evacuees were spread throughout the country – the volume of evacuees would
overwhelm individual states and so had to be shared.
Moreover, an assessment of the timeline of response activities to Hurricane Katrina
indicates that each response relies on some other response; that unanticipated events are an
integral part of each critical incident, and that each event responded to can potentially trigger
other events, most of which are unanticipated.
Timeline
On Sunday, August 28, 2005 at around 9:00 am New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issues a
mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans on advice from National Hurricane Center Director
Max Mayfield that category four storm Katrina heads for New Orleans (Drye, 2005; DeLozier,
2005). National Hurricane Center warns that the storm is potentially catastrophic indicating that
some levees in the greater New Orleans Area could overflow their banks resulting in significant
storm surge flooding (Drye, 2005); therefore residents in low lying areas are encouraged to
evacuate. The Superdome and nine other shelters open to allow people in (DeLozier, 2005). Late
Sunday night thousands of New Orleans residents were either unable to leave or chose not to
(Drye, 2005). By noon on Sunday August 28, highways are packed, and the city activates contraflow traffic system to allow for outgoing traffic only (DeLozier, 2005).
By 8:00 am on Monday, August 29, 2005 Mayor Nagin reports that the New Orleans
levees have been breached and that water was flowing over the levees. By 11:00 am a major
levee has failed in New Orleans dumping water through the 17th Street Canal; the city of New
Orleans begins to flood (Drye, 2005). Throughout the day water continues to pour into New
Orleans from breaches in the city’s levees. The Superdome sustains damage to the roof and other
areas of the building with about 10,000 people inside and the National Guard is called in
(DeLozier, 2005). The breach was the point at which the trigger reaches critical mass, the boiling
point in a set of instabilities in the environment. It is the point at which a trigger cascades into a
rapidly changing set of circumstances that compels the important actors to pay close attention to
a changing situation.
12
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On Tuesday August 30, about 80% of New Orleans is covered in water; 20 feet in some
places (Drye, 2005). FEMA stops volunteer firefighters with emergency experience from
entering the city due to the insecurity of the city (DeLozier). There is an official call for anyone
with boats to help in the rescue operation. The mayor announces that the city’s pumps will fail
by sheer volume and intensity of the water flowing into the city. Reports suggest widespread
looting (DeLozier, 2005; Drye, 2005).
Wednesday August 31, Governor Blanco orders remaining residents in New Orleans to
leave the city; however, there are no buses and trucks to carry out that order (Drye, 2005). Health
and Human Services secretary declares federal health emergency throughout the Gulf Coast and
sends in medical supplies and workers (DeLozier, 2005). Health related problems beginning to
surface as a result of water-borne diseases, environmental pollution from chemicals, lead from
petroleum, household pesticides and sewage mix in the cities (Shah, 2005). Buses start to arrive
to evacuate about 25, 000 from the Superdome; 52,000 are in Red Cross shelters. By midday the
water stops rising in New Orleans. Looting grows exponentially and the police are forced to
focus on violence, looting, and carjacking rather than search and rescue (DeLozier, 2005).
FEMA water rescue operations suspended because of gun fire (Drye, 2005; DeLozier, 2005). At
the same time there is a breach in the London Avenue canal.
Thursday September 1, New Orleans mayor issues desperate SOS to federal government
for help (e.g., no food for those seeking shelter in the Louisiana Superdome and the New Orleans
Convention Center) (Drye, 2005). The New Orleans Convention Center was never listed in the
New Orleans Comprehensive Response Plan as a shelter before its use. On September 2, the U.S.
National Guard along with supply trucks arrives in New Orleans; Congress returns from recess,
approves and President Bush signs a $10.5 billion in aid bill (Drye, 2005; DeLozier 2005).
Friday September 2, President Bush tours the area and acknowledges the government’s failure;
more national guardsmen deployed to New Orleans. U.S and Europe tap oil and gas reserves as
gas prices soar to approximately $3.00 per gallon because of refinery damage (DeLozier, 2005;
CNN, 2005). There are explosions at chemical storage plant in New Orleans with resulting
scattered fires (DeLozier, 2005). On Saturday September 2, 200 officers walk off the job in the
New Orleans police force; two commit suicide. U.S. Labor Department announces $62 million in
emergency grants for displaced workers. On September 4, Louisiana Governor Blanco declares
state of public health emergency. Monday September 5, most of the gaps in levees closed; 500
New Orleans officers unaccounted for, some refiners restart production. Tuesday, September 6,
less than 10,000 people still remained in New Orleans (Drye, 2005; DeLozier, 2005). Thursday
September 8, $52 billion in aid approved by Congress to complement $10.5 billion already
approved (DeLozier, 2005).
Hurricane Katrina also presented lasting environmental and psychological impacts. For
instance Nina Shen Rastogi (2010) noted the high levels of toxicity five years after Hurricane
Katrina, while psychologist Matthew Tull (2009) observed the increased severity of posttraumatic stress disorder in those who experienced the event, particularly among those with preexisting psychiatric disorder. For these individuals there was greater risk of trauma from the
event and from watching coverage of the event.
The timeline of events shows the complexity of critical incidents, their non-linearity, and
their ability to quickly overwhelm the local, and sometimes even national, ability to cope. The
timeline helps to validate the notion of equifinality articulated in the open systems perspective
and also shows the influence that environmental factors pose for open systems.
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Governance Systems
In this context, governance systems are mediating government or organizational
mechanisms (local, national and international), as well as individuals (including volunteers) that
respond to critical incidents. They comprise government offices and field offices at various
levels of governance, organizations involved in service provision, or responsible for the event or
circumstances leading to the critical incident, and non-governmental actors involved within the
policy area of the critical incident. In the Ochberg et al. (2007) model of critical incident analysis
(see figure 1), governance system specifically refer to government and its interaction with the
governed. It is government that directs interventions to sort out or mitigate critical incidents.
However, within the framework presented in this paper, governance must be understood in a
wider context.
The idea of a government standing above society steering it has long been debunked by
those who study networks and governance structures. These scholars (e.g., Agranoff & McGuire,
2003; Ansell & Gash, 2007; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; O’Toole & Meier, 2004) argue
that governments, becoming aware of their limitations and the limitations of downstream
implementation, have strategically retreated from their “public domain through privatization,
deregulation, and decentralization strategies” (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1999). This
argument has articulated what many had known for a while – the conventional view of
governance with government steering from above was no longer relevant and had given way to a
new governance paradigm. In this new paradigm there are self-steering mechanisms that ensured
the smooth execution of policy by all kinds of actors involved in governance, not just
government (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1999).
In critical incidents, there are diverse networks of actors involved in each stage of a
critical incident, including those that remain engaged long after the critical incident has
stabilized. Government agencies at various levels, private organizations including suppliers and
contractors, citizens and voluntary groups, hospital and allied healthcare facilities, psychiatric
services, and the media, among others, comprise the bulk of these actors involved in governance.
Community Rationalization
How the community comes to grips with the critical incident, the way they process the
information and experiences, and the measures put in place to limit, in the case of negative
outcomes, or encourage in the case of positive outcomes, the recurrence of similar events in the
future at the community level are termed community rationalizing. Community rationalizing
includes, but is not limited to, a collective sorting through of what happened and how to limit or
encourage future recurrence.
The community includes the immediate community impacted, or it can involve a wider
community such as a country, region, or the globe depending on the scale of the event and the
number of people who are witness to the event. The 2008 global economic meltdown is one such
example, although it started in the USA, it had implications for almost every citizen of the globe
as to whether they were employed or not, government instituted austerity measures, and their
overall personal lifestyle. The civil rights movement of the 1960s had far reaching impact:
nationally in terms of who could access loans, what communities minorities could live in, what
colleges minorities could attend, what social services could be accessed, minority representation
in sporting events, government and so on. The movement also influenced those in other parts of
the world who sought to redress civil injustices. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown
changed not only nuclear safety regulations for power stations, but also changed how we plan for
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possible meltdowns both in the USA and globally. No one was spared the images of these events,
the constant commentary and expert analyses or the findings of technical panels on the issues.
These are key influences on how individuals understand and respond to critical incidents.
Learning
Learning is a key component in critical incident analysis because of its importance in
stabilizing a critical incident and to impact recurrence of the event. It is a continuous and
ongoing process of capturing information, processing it and making decisions based on the
information and knowledge garnered. Learning is the feedback that regulates the critical incident
(open system) – it informs change and also helps us to codify knowledge.
Feedback
Feedback is the interactions of the various components of the system because they can no
longer act independently. When they interact they start to influence each other (Skytner, 2007). It
is this relationship that gives the system its properties and behavior. In this framework, lessons
learned constitute the feedback loop. Lessons are learned throughout the critical incident. Some
lessons are quickly applied, but others must be codified, and applied in planning and strategies
for coping. These lessons influence policy, strategies for planning and response, risk reduction,
individual behavior and so on.
Outcome Components
Outcome components can be observed and measured over the short, medium and long
term from system interaction after the critical incident has occurred. Outcome components in the
case of Hurricane Katrina include changes in policies in FEMA, changes in levee construction
codes, changes in behavior of citizens in response to evacuation orders and changes in
regulations, and so on. Outcome is used in this paper as opposed to output because output is
more immediate. The outcomes of critical incidents are not necessarily immediately observed,
they can arise over the medium to long term.
Change
Due to the scale, complexity, novelty and visibility of critical incidents, they are
accompanied by change. The changes are profound or transformational and can be observed at
multiple levels and at varying degrees.
Policy Change
Policy change usually follows a critical incident. Transformational change indicate new
and sweeping legislation and regulations to affect actions that lead to the critical incident,
significant increase or decrease in budgetary allocations, creation of new agencies organizational
change, and so on.
A number of policy changes were initiated and passed based on lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina. The Department of Homeland Security (2008) outlined a few acts that apply
to future federal emergency actions and also have implications for state emergency actions. They
include: Title VI of P.L. 109-295 (H.R. 5441) the post Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act 2006; Security and Accountability for Every Port Act 2005 (SAFE Port Act); Pet Evacuation
and Transportation Standards Act 2006; Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act
2006; Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act 2005; and John Warner National Defense
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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Of these statutes, the Post-Katrina Reform Act is notable
for its long-term consequences for FEMA and other federal entities (DHS, 2008). According to
the 2006 CRS report, the Act “reorganizes FEMA, expands its statutory authority, it imposes
new conditions and requirements on the operations of the agency” (CRS, 2006). A number of
emergency management functions were consolidated within FEMA, its status was elevated
within the department, and was granted enhanced organizational autonomy. FEMA’s Office of
Gulf Coast Recovery was also set up as a result of Katrina.
Behavioral Change
Behavioral changes occur after a critical incident. For example, in the case of Hurricane
Katrina, complex computer models created by scientists and engineers from Louisiana State
University as well as studies carried out by scholars at the University of California at Berkeley
show that “faulty design, inadequate construction or some combination of the two were the likely
cause of the breaches to the levee system in New Orleans (Grunwald & Glasser, 2005, A1).
Grunwald and Glasser (2005) note that: based on a national discussion of Flood Plain protection
that ensued post Hurricane Katrina there is now routine maintenance of the flood plains; and, the
Army Corps of Engineers has instituted a number of organizational changes to minimize the
chance of levee breach after massive flooding. For instance maintenance practices, technology,
frequency and process of monitoring, and the organization of those stakeholders focusing on the
Louisiana levee system have improved. Prior to Hurricane Katrina communities around the
country were negligent in terms of their preparedness for critical incidents (Bell, 2006).
Other Changes
Locally in New Orleans and around the country, Hurricane Katrina highlighted the role of
mutual aid (Bell, 2006). Bell notes that approximately 38 states and 66,000 people responded to
the incident. There is now a large New Orleans diaspora. People who had never left the
community, let alone the state were uprooted, leaving family ties, cultural ties, church and other
social fabric affiliation.
In addition, there is a large volunteer contingent of remaining residents in New Orleans
who are active in monitoring the levees and in holding accountable those whose job it is to
maintain the levee system.
Nationally, Hurricane Irene in 2011 illustrated how seriously people take the threat of a
pending hazard and the importance they place on preparation and on heeding evacuation orders.
Days prior to Irene’s impact, all along the Eastern Seaboard emergency plans were put into
effect, and there were mandatory evacuation orders. Some cities enforced state of emergency to
ensure law and order were maintained and shelters were set up. These types of preparedness
plans bear testament to the institution of lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina.
When the right lessons are learned there is sweeping or transformational change at one or
multiple levels. When lessons are partially learned, only incremental changes are made.
Application of the Model
This section provides insights on how scholars and researchers wishing to test the model
may do so. To reiterate, open systems framework is proposed as a tool for evaluating what
incidents are critical incidents – how do we delineate and understand them. It is hoped that these
steps to the model’s application will help other scholars wanting to test the framework and fine
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tune it over time. This approach has been used by scholars in the past to guide the application of
a proposed framework. For instance, Margaret Polski and Nobel-laureate Elenor Ostrom (1999)
used this approach when they developed the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
(IAD),
A number of steps should be considered in the application of the proposed framework.
The steps are as follows:
Step one: Define what is meant by critical incident.
The definition-in-use of a critical incident is very broad and leaves a lot to interpretation. This
provides the flexibility to categorize incidents as they occur. Recall that critical incidents are
unscripted and unanticipated. As such, the definition should not be so rigid as to box in
researchers and other scholars who in the future need to identify and analyze critical incidents.
Step two: Identify the trigger and the activating event.
There are multiple triggers of critical incidents. Triggers may be natural, technological or
human (social). The activating event is usually different from the trigger and can be the result of
anything, but it is a specific point in time (i.e., a pivotal moment). Identifying the trigger and the
activating event will help with the classification of the critical incident.
Step three: Identify and analyze the cause-and effect chains throughout the critical incident, but
especially in the interventions (Response stage).
One method that can help with this analysis is the Fishbone analysis that provides a
structured way of effects and the causes that lead to these effects (Gupta, 2010). First, note the
types of interventions. Second, label these interventions as either “novel” or “routine” and “large
scale” or “small scale”. This will assist to differentiate the incident from an ordinary disaster.
Descriptions placed on the incidents by the media and experts will aid this determination.
Critical incidents display no-linear patterns because of the multiple and varying causes and
effects throughout the individual critical incident. These causes and consequences in turn
influence outcome(s).
Step four: Identify, evaluate and label the impacts.
Secondary research, such as content analyses and interviews, will aid with this activity.
Superlatives used in these descriptions are a good indicator of the nature of an incident – critical
incident or routine event. In addition, estimates of destruction, social impacts, deaths, and so on
will provide a good picture of impacts. Note that multiple primary and secondary impacts will be
observed nationally and internationally.
Step five: Analyze what feedback mechanisms apply.
In social systems like critical incidents, learning is a good indicator of a feedback
mechanism because one is able to see its expression in the changes that take place. Note that
changes take place at multiple levels. This means that we must first define what is meant by
learning and then deconstruct the multiple levels and meanings.
Step six: Determine outcomes.
Analyze national and local policy outcomes, community and local outcomes, and global
outcomes separately. These include changes in value systems, sweeping policy overhauls, and
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changes in community norms. These activities present a challenge because of our ability to
quantify changes such as value system changes but are a critical step in delineating a critical
incident. However, carefully defining what each change means will greatly aid this process. Note
that multiple primary and secondary outcomes will be observed locally, nationally and
internationally. Because they are usually not readily evident, it might be difficult to delineate
secondary outcomes of a critical incident.
Step seven: Determine the level of the analysis to be done.
An important consideration is at what level – local, national, international – can the
framework be applied. The cases relied on as examples all took place in a local context (all
incidents are local); however, the scale and unprecedented nature soon gave them national and
international significance. For the sake of analysis, one must be able to put a boundary around a
critical incident. This is easier done at the national as opposed to the global level because
impacts and outcomes become unwieldy and difficult to associate with a particular critical
incident. Within that level there are multiple units of analysis – who are the actors and their
relationships throughout the critical incident (See Till, 2010) – responders and types of
responses, resource needs and suppliers, impacts, and types of change that resulted.
There are collaborative strategies that could allow for critical incident analysis at a global
level, for instance multiple case study analysis (see Tellis, 1997; Yin 1994, 2009). Multiple case
study approaches improve validity and builds some reliability in the findings.
Conclusion
The open systems perspective presents a dynamic framework that encapsulates the
essential components that can be observed in all critical incidents. The open system perspective
facilitates a more holistic understanding of critical incidents and will therefore facilitate a more
complete understanding of critical incidents.
More specifically, there are several benefits of using the open systems perspective to
propose a framework for critical incidents. First, it allows an alternative avenue to understand
this phenomenon outside a static cause-and-effect relationship. Open systems thinking allows us
to see simultaneous patterns of interactions, rather than limiting us to sequential interactions that
cause-and-effect models permit. Because one can observe simultaneous interactions, one can
also observe the non-linear patterns of relationships that occur in critical incidents. Open systems
perspective also helps us to see that not all relationships involved in critical incidents are
proportional in that a small trigger can have tremendous consequences and vice versa.
Second, unlike static models that only allow us to study critical incident components in
discrete segments, those utilizing systems thinking allow us to study them together, thus
affording insights into their nuances of the relationships and interdependencies as the critical
incident progresses.
Third, open systems perspective allows us to understand that a critical incident’s end state
can be reached by any of multiple means (Bertalanffy, 1968) because components within the
system interact in a non-random and patterned way. This interaction results in not one, but many
paths system outcome (Tompkins, 2005). As such, one needs to tackle critical incidents on
multiple strategic fronts using multiple interventions and with multiple actors.
Fourth, because of the unscripted and unanticipated nature of critical incidents, learning
lessons as the critical incident unfolds is important. How one applies what one learns impacts the
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outcome of the critical incident system in the short and medium term. Learning and applying
lessons will also reduce the likelihood of negative outcome or increase the likelihood of positive
outcomes as a result of similar activating events in the future. It is therefore important to capture
important lessons, document them, incorporate lessons learned in policies and programs to
understand and benefit from critical incidents.
The proposed framework has the potential to aid our understanding of critical incidents.
This framework must now be tested and refined. The steps proposed to the framework’s
application are tentative, and many of the steps can be applied simultaneously rather than
sequentially. These steps can be refined over time. Refinement, as Sabatier (1999) reminds us,
will facilitate the development of a clear and logically coherent and interrelated set of
propositions or approaches to critical incident analysis.
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